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Chinese Engagement Abroad in the 
Scrap Business
Introduction
Since the late 2 0 1 0 s, discussions on the transnational trade in recyclable 
waste tend to centre on China. In particular, the announcement by the 
Chinese central government of a ban on imports of 2 4  categories of scrap in 
July 2 0 1 7  drew considerable attention worldwide. It brought to the forefront 
the predominant role played by China in the contemporary commerce 
and conversion of discarded goods, a sector that has globalised in the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.
Chinese engagement in the global trade and transformation of recyclable 
waste is not new, even though it rarely made international headlines until 
recently. Yet, detailed and comprehensive accounts of the phenomenon are 
lacking (a notable exception is Minter 2 0 1 3 ). In particular, there exists no 
systematic study of the presence of Chinese socioeconomic actors abroad. 
The present paper fills this gap. Using a historical perspective, it reveals 
what led Chinese scrap dealers and recyclers to extend the scope of their 
professional activity beyond the borders of their home country and describes 
the changing nature of their activities.
In terms of methods, the paper invokes findings that stem in part from 
ethnographic fieldwork I conducted in Guangdong Province between 2 0 1 4  
and 2 0 1 8 , in part from documentary research I carried out using a wide 
range of sources, including academic and non-academic publications, press 
articles, and legal or other official documents. My main focus is on two 
categories of goods, namely discarded plastics and discarded electrical and 
electronic equipment (DEEE or “e-waste,” dianzi laji, dianzi feiqiwu 電子垃
圾,電子廢棄物). The latter category includes used smartphones, defunct air 
conditioners, and obsolete washing machines, for instance, as well as parts 
or components thereof. Discarded plastics and DEEE can be referred to as 
“scrap,” because they are recyclable, at least to some extent. Yet, they are 
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often called “waste,” “debris,” or “trash.” There is no ontological difference 
between one set of terms and the other. As the saying goes, one man’s 
trash is another’s treasure (see Reno 2 0 0 9 ). Whether or not a given object 
or material still possesses some value depends on a lot of factors, including 
available technologies, social networks, economic calculations, and moral 
values (Gille 2 0 0 7 ). This article deals mainly with scrap in an extended sense, 
i.e., solid waste that is imbued with the potential of transforming (again) into 
a resource, i.e., a source of (secondary) raw materials.
In terms of conceptual framework, the paper draws inspiration from 
recent social science research on waste (aka discard studies), in particular 
work that seeks to explain the transnational trade in waste and global 
recycling economies. Debates on this topic have thus far largely been framed 
by the environmental justice paradigm (see Mohai et al . 2 0 0 9 ; Pellow 
2 0 1 0 ), which perceives the waste products of the rich consumer societies 
of the Global North as a form of neocolonialism, as they are dumped on 
the peoples and environments of the Global South. Under this paradigm, 
the environmental costs of the consumer societies of the Global North are 
seen as being externalised through the use of nature in the Global South as 
an uncosted sink. However, as economic geographers Nicky Gregson and 
Mike Crang point out (2 0 1 5 : 1 5 3 ), more recent research on global recycling 
has challenged such accounts. It shows that they obscure a complex global 
trade in secondary resources that are recovered for manufacturing purposes. 
Gregson and Crang acknowledge that “high profile instances of toxic waste 
dumping continue to grab media headlines,” but contend that these are the 
exceptions rather than the rule. They explain that most waste is actually 
harvested in the Global North by networks of buyers and traders from the 
Global South, then shipped to the Global South, where it is processed and 
recycled into even more manufactured goods, many of which find their way 
back to the Global North (ibid., see also 1 6 1 ).
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In the mid-2 0 1 0 s, the global trade in recyclable waste had become a 
multimillion-dollar business – in which, it should be noted, China played a 
predominant role. As Gregson and Crang rightly observe, the environmental 
justice paradigm does not account fully for this phenomenon. A planet-
wide displacement of pollution does take place, but there is more at stake 
in the transnational exchange of discarded objects and materials on a global 
scale (Iles 2 0 0 4 ; Rivoli 2 0 0 5 ; Alexander and Reno 2 0 1 2 ). Not only that, but 
the environmental justice paradigm often leads to the assumption that 
waste flows from the Global North to the Global South. This is reflected, 
inter alia, in the geographical imaginary of the Basel Convention, a key law 
governing the international waste trade. However, material flows are more 
complex and multi-directional (Lepawsky and McNabb 2 0 1 0 ; Furniss 2 0 1 5 ; 
Lepawsky 2 0 1 5 b), which raises questions about the relevance of current legal 
instruments (Lepawsky 2 0 1 5 a).
Based on the knowledge described above, I argue that the Chinese central 
government’s embrace of the environmental dumping narrative needs to 
be taken with a pinch of salt. Not only does it misrepresent the crucial role 
scrap imports have played in the country’s development in the past, it also 
obfuscates current national-level issues that are arguably more important 
than pollution arising from imported waste (Liebman 2 0 1 8 ). Key among 
these is the expansion and upgrading of the domestic municipal solid waste 
(MSW) management sector, which features close collaboration between 
local governments and large corporations. As we shall see, this collaboration 
has a bearing of the current nature of Chinese engagement abroad in the 
scrap business.
Each of the following three sections corresponds more or less to a period 
in time and focuses on the presence abroad of a particular type of socio-
economic actor. The first one (1 9 8 0 s to 2 0 0 0 s) addresses Chinese scrap 
buyers, the second one (2 0 1 0 -2 0 1 8 ) Chinese scrap processors, and the third 
one (2 0 1 8 -2 0 2 0 ) Chinese scrap service providers, equipment makers, and 
facility builders.
Buying scrap abroad
Citizens from mainland China have been going abroad to make a living 
from scrap since the early 1 9 9 0 s. Their motive was to source goods that 
could serve as raw materials once recycled, and to ship them back to 
their country. The first wave of Chinese people who settled or invested 
abroad to make a living from scrap consisted mainly of private, often self-
made entrepreneurs who ran micro-, small, or medium-sized enterprises 
(MSMEs). It can be considered part of a wider phenomenon that some 
refer to as “globalisation from below” (Mathews et al . 2 0 1 2 ) as opposed 
to the movement of goods, people, and capital driven by the activity of 
governments, corporations, and financial institutions.
Taiwanese set the ball rolling
By going abroad, businesspeople from China largely followed a trend set 
by their counterparts from Taiwan a decade or two earlier. In his account 
of the globalisation of the scrap trade at the turn of the twentieth century, 
Adam Minter tells the stories of several Taiwanese men who ventured to 
the United States and other faraway countries in order to obtain recyclable 
materials. One of them, Joe, started criss-crossing the United States in 
1 9 7 1  to buy low-grade scrap, which rising labour costs and environmental 
crackdowns in that country were making unattractive to domestic recyclers. 
Within a decade, Joe was able to establish his own scrapyard back home.1  
John Seabrook writes about another Taiwanese businessman, a man named 
Yaw Bin (Tony) Huang, who started out buying aluminium and copper scrap 
from dealers in the United States and selling it in Taiwan. After 1 5  years, Tony 
moved back to Taiwan and founded a company called Sigma, which Seabrook 
describes as “the largest recycler of aluminium in China” in the mid-2 0 0 0 s.2  
In the late 1 9 8 0 s and early 1 9 9 0 s, a combination of push and pull factors 
led many Taiwanese businesspeople like Joe and Tony to relocate their 
operations to China. Among these factors were rising labour costs in Taiwan, 
an increasingly intolerant public and official stance on burning and dumping 
associated with the scrap industry, and a ban on imports of “mixed metal 
scrap” into Taiwan (Terao 2 0 0 5 ) – which prefigured measures taken more 
recently by the Chinese government. At the time, China did not have any 
environmental regulations related to the import of scrap metal and only very 
few customs officials able to assess a duty on scrap. On the whole, this made 
business easier, although it also posed some challenges. The companies set 
up by Taiwanese businesspeople in China grew rapidly, thanks mainly to the 
country’s insatiable appetite for recyclables, especially metals.
Mainland Chinese jump on the bandwagon
Like the Taiwanese – and following their example, to some extent – many 
mainland Chinese soon started to move across the globe looking for scrap to 
ship back to their home country. Perhaps the most famous of all is Cheung 
Yan, who became known in China and beyond as one of the world’s richest 
women in the mid-2 0 0 0 s. In an interview published by The New Yorker in 
2 0 0 9 , Cheung recalls her modest beginning as an accountant in Northeast 
China and explains how she and her husband made a fortune thanks to the 
wastepaper trade.3  The couple founded a company called America Chung 
Nam that bought old corrugated containers in the United States and shipped 
them to China, where they were used in the production of containerboard. “By 
2 0 0 1 , Cheung’s company had reached an extraordinary milestone,” writes the 
interviewer, Evan Osnos; “it had surpassed global giants such as DuPont and 
Procter & Gamble to become the single largest exporter, by volume, of freight 
from the United States. In other words, nobody in America was shipping more 
of anything each year anywhere in the world.” The business expanded further, 
and Cheung eventually came to run China’s largest paper manufacturer in 
the late 2 0 0 0 s, Nine Dragons Paper (Jiulong Zhiye 玖龍紙業).
America Chung Nam is a true business success story, so it cannot be 
considered to be representative of all scrap-related Chinese ventures 
abroad. However, the particular opportunities that Cheung and her 
husband identified and seized while living and working in the United States 
arose from more general circumstances, notably: (1 ) the huge volume of 
recyclables generated by North-American consumption and the relatively 
effective collection systems in that part of the world; (2 ) the migration 
of manufacturing to China, which created a strong Chinese demand for 
materials such as old corrugated containers; and (3 ) the cost of shipping 
cargo from North America to China, which was lowered considerably by 
the fact that container vessels linking the two regions could not head back 
empty. Other circumstances such as the advent of consumerism in China 
and the limited availability of resources within that country also played an 
important role. Finally, Joshua Goldstein also mentions “labour outsourcing, 
1 . Adam Minter, “How China Profits From Our Junk,” The Atlantic, 1 st November 2 0 1 3 , https://www.
theatlantic.com/china/archive/2 0 1 3 /1 1 /how-china-profits-from-our-junk/2 8 1 0 4 4 / [reproduced 
in Minter 2 0 1 3 ] (accessed on 1 5  July 2 0 2 0 ).
2 . John Seabrook, “American Scrap: An Old-School Industry Globalizes,” The New Yorker, 6  January 
2 0 0 8 , https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2 0 0 8 /0 1 /1 4 /american-scrap (accessed on 1 5  July 
2 0 2 0 ). 
3 . Evan Osnos, “Wastepaper Queen: She’s China’s Horatio Alger Hero. Will Her Fortune Survive?,” 
The New Yorker, 2 3  March 2 0 0 9 , https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2 0 0 9 /0 3 /3 0 /wastepaper-
queen (accessed on 1 5  July 2 0 2 0 ).
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the lowering of trade barriers, breakthroughs in containerization and 
shipping, and a virtual pandemic of urbanization” (Goldstein 2 0 1 2 : 3 4 2 ).
In the global scrap trade, the relationship between China and North 
America was particularly emblematic, in large part because it involved 
huge volumes of materials (see Brooks et al . 2 0 1 8 ). However, more or less 
the same type of relationship could be observed between China and other 
industrialised regions of the world, notably Western Europe (see Velis 2 0 1 4  
on waste plastics) and Northeast Asia (see Terazono et al . 2 0 0 4 ; Meng and 
Yoshida 2 0 1 2 ).
While doing fieldwork in China in the mid-2 0 1 0 s, I interviewed several 
Chinese scrap traders who had operations abroad or were spending a 
considerable amount of time traveling outside of China for business 
purposes. One of them was Dave Zhuang.4  I met him in Singapore in 
November 2 0 1 4 , during a guided tour of a recycling plant. Zhuang has built 
his career on the cross-border trade in scrap and dedicated his life to this 
professional activity. While we talked, he told me that it had always been his 
“dream” (mengxiang 夢想) to make a living from scrap trading, and that he 
had worked hard to make this dream come true. In the mid-2 0 0 0 s, Zhuang 
founded what eventually became one of China’s main online platforms for 
finding information on prices and trading scrap. Later, Zhuang launched his 
own company, which sourced scrap from all over the world and supplied 
mainly China-based customers. The company exported goods, including 
DEEE, from foreign countries and sometimes imported them into China as 
well. On the latter point, Zhuang insisted that his company only imported 
authorised goods, which excluded DEEE. But he made no secret of the fact 
that his customers brought DEEE into China through “smuggling” (zousi 走
私). Zhuang’s company was headquartered in Ningbo (Zhejiang Province) 
and had offices and scrapyards in many countries, including not only China 
but also Spain, Pakistan, and the United States. Zhuang spent only a third of 
his time in Ningbo. The other two thirds he spent in scrapyards abroad and 
in hotels, airplanes, or rental cars, respectively. He joked that his family never 
knew where he was.
In May 2 0 1 5 , while doing fieldwork in Qingyuan, I met with two brothers 
who specialised in copper-containing cables and “mixed metals” (zahuo 雜
貨). Hu Ge and Hu Di, as I shall call them here, bought goods abroad from 
some of the world’s leading recycling companies (e.g., SIMS Recycling, 
One Steel), shipped them to Qingyuan, and processed them in their own 
scrapyards, using mostly manual labour and a few basic machines. The 
brothers travelled frequently to foreign countries and possessed multi-year 
business visas for several of them, including the United States, Australia, and 
the United Kingdom. Hu Ge, who was in his mid-fifties, had been involved 
in this line of business for 2 0  years. Having visited many places outside of 
China, he was not short of anecdotes about his business trips and parallel 
sightseeing activities. While we were chatting, he showed me pictures he 
had taken on the other side of the planet. Even though they did not speak 
English, the two brothers clearly had cosmopolitan leanings and considered 
themselves members of a large, global family of scrap traders.
Developing countries become a destination
Up until the turn of the century, Chinese individuals and companies that 
bought scrap abroad to ship back to China principally settled or invested in 
regions of the world such as North America and Western Europe. Starting 
in the 2 0 0 0 s, however, some of them also ventured into less industrially 
advanced and economically developed regions, including Africa, Southeast 
Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East. If we focus on DEEE and the mid-
2 0 1 0 s, for instance, Chinese businessmen could be found in a number of 
African countries, including Ghana (Fernández-Font Pérez 2 0 1 4 ), Kenya 
(Reboux 2 0 1 7 ), and Nigeria (Sala, forthcoming). In these countries, they 
typically bought back printed circuit boards (PCBs) and wires or cables 
collected by self-employed workers and shipped them back home. What 
made this kind of economic activity viable is the fact that African countries 
had very few enterprises capable of extracting and refining valuables metals 
(e.g. gold, silver, copper) from these types of goods, whereas China had 
plenty, notably in large rural recycling hubs located along the coast (Tong 
and Wang 2 0 1 2 ).
Transforming scrap abroad
In terms of protagonists, the second wave of Chinese engagement abroad 
in the scrap business features very much the same kind of socioeconomic 
actors as the first one, namely private, self-made entrepreneurs that ran 
family businesses or MSMEs. Therefore, like the first one, it can be described 
as globalisation from below.
Since the turn of the century, many of those specialising in DEEE and 
plastics decided to relocate their dismantling and/or processing operations 
outside of China. This is mainly due to China’s national policy on scrap 
imports, which has changed considerably in a relatively short timeframe. 
Indeed, in just 2 0  years the policy went from being relatively permissive and 
weakly enforced to being extremely restrictive and strongly enforced. This 
section explores some of the effects of this rapid tightening up.
DEEE is banned from import
The first efforts to regulate scrap inflows to China date back to the mid-
1 9 9 0 s5  and were quickly applied to DEEE. The central government adopted 
an import ban on these types of goods in February 2 0 0 0 6  and expanded it in 
later years.7  At the end of the 2 0 0 0 s, a total of 5 5  categories of DEEE were 
prohibited from entering Chinese territory. However, the ban did not apply 
to all categories of DEEE; Chinese state authorities considered some of them 
useful and relatively unproblematic sources of raw materials, and therefore 
authorised them under certain conditions.8
There is good reason to believe that the main goal pursued through the 
import ban has changed over the years. Initially, it may have been to stick 
a spoke in the wheels of the reuse economy, a vibrant sector in reform-era 
China (Minter 2 0 1 3 ), in order to help Chinese brands grow and gain more 
4 . Names have been anonymised.
5 . Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, “中華人民共和國固體廢物污染環境
防治法” (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guti feiwu wuran huanjing fangzhi fa, Law of the People’s 
Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution by Solid Wastes), 
1 9 9 5  [revised in 2 0 0 4 , 2 0 1 3  and 2 0 1 6 ], http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=8 2 6 df5 acc2 7 5 f7 d7
bdfb&lib=law (accessed on 1 5  July 2 0 2 0 ).
6 . State Environmental Protection Administration, “關于進口第七類廢物有關問題的通知” 
(Guanyu jinkou diqi lei feiwu youguan wenti de tongzhi, Notification on Import of the Seventh 
Category of Wastes), 2 0 0 0 , http://www.law-lib.com/LAW/law_view.asp?id=1 0 8 7 8 6  (accessed on 
1 5  July 2 0 2 0 ). 
7 . Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation et al . “禁止進口貨物目錄” (Jinzhi jinkou 
huowu mulu, List of Goods Prohibited From Import), 2 0 0 2 , http://www.mee.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/
gwy/2 0 0 9 1 0 /t2 0 0 9 1 0 3 0 _1 8 0 6 9 1 .htm (accessed on 2 9  September 2 0 1 9 ); SEPA, “禁止進口固
體廢物目錄” (Jinzhi jinkou guti feiwu mulu, Catalog of Solid Waste Prohibited From Import), 
2 0 0 8 , http://www.mep.gov.cn/gkml/zj/gg/2 0 0 9 1 0 /t2 0 0 9 1 0 2 1 _1 7 1 7 9 2 .htm (accessed on 1 5  July 
2 0 2 0 ); Ministry of Environmental Protection, “關于調整進口廢物管理目錄的公告” (Guanyu 
tiaozheng jinkou feiwu guanli mulu de gonggao, Announcement on the Adjustment of the Catalog 
on the Management of Imported Waste), 2 0 0 9 , http://www.mee.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/bgg/2 0 0 9 1 0 /
t2 0 0 9 1 0 2 2 _1 7 4 5 6 6 .htm (accessed on 1 5  July 2 0 2 0 ).
8 . See “進口七類廢物標準” (Jinkou qilei feiwu biaozhun, Standards for the Imports of 
Wastes from the Seventh Category), Mymetal.net , 6  July 2 0 1 6 , http://www.mymetal.
net/1 6 /0 7 0 6 /1 1 /8 7 FC7 5 4 2 1 7 FADD3 A.html (accessed on 1 5  July 2 0 2 0 ). 
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market share.9  Later on, after a scandal erupted in connection with severe 
pollution in Guiyu, a town located in the eastern part of Guangdong Province, 
the central government mainly sought to put an end to the pollution caused 
by DEEE dismantling and processing workshops.1 0  Since then, environmental 
protection acts as the main official justification – although protectionism 
arguably has not lost its validity as an explanatory factor.
Despite the regulatory efforts described above, flows of DEEE into China 
continued more or less unabated until the early 2 0 1 0 s, as my interviews 
indicate (see also Grossman 2 0 0 7 : 1 9 9 ). This was mainly due to lack of 
implementation and weak enforcement (Ni and Zeng 2 0 0 9 : 3 9 9 3 ; Chung 
and Zhang 2 0 1 1 : 2 6 3 9 ; Wang et al . 2 0 1 3 : 3 1 ). In addition, imports were 
tolerated in some cases, though not officially. For instance, Chinese state 
authorities turned a blind eye to the trade in scrap PCBs and second-hand 
DEEE intended for re-export that took place between Vietnam and China 
during the mid-2 0 0 0 s (Yoshida 2 0 0 5 ; Shinkuma and Huong 2 0 0 9 : 2 7 ). 
Finally, loopholes also made it possible for DEEE to find its way into China. 
For instance, shipments of mixed metal scrap for recycling that contained a 
small proportion of DEEE were still deemed compliant.
Crackdown operations close the valves
In the early 2 0 1 0 s, the central and provincial governments took action to 
better control and monitor imports of scrap and waste material. In August 
2 0 1 1 , five ministries jointly issued new administrative measures1 1  with the 
aim of tackling practices that had become common in China’s recycling 
sector despite being unlawful, including the borrowing, renting, or selling 
of import licenses, the reselling of imported waste, and the importing of 
waste that does not qualify as raw materials. This legal text made clear that 
violations would be punished and specified the penalties. By doing so, it set 
the tone for what was to follow.
Starting in 2 0 1 3 , the Ministry of Environmental Protection, the General 
Administration of Customs, and the General Administration of Quality 
Supervision, Inspection, and Quarantine embarked on several nationwide 
“special joint operations” (lianhe zhuanxiang xingdong 聯合專項行動), 
which were aimed at monitoring scrap imports more closely and increasing 
the frequency, scale, and effectiveness of official inspections, notably in ports. 
These operations were dubbed “Green Fence” (Lüli  綠籬)1 2  and “National 
Sword” (Guomen lijian 國門利劍).1 3  They raised the bar very high in terms 
of quality and cracked down on smuggling and other illegal activities, 
thereby making China’s borders more scraptight, so to speak.
In the mid-2 0 1 0 s, there were still indications of DEEE smuggling.1 4  For 
instance, I noted in February 2 0 1 6  that a WeChat public account called “source 
of electronic goods” (dianzi huoyuan 電子貨源) offered mainland Chinese 
buyers quite openly a wide variety of electronic devices, parts, and components 
sourced abroad. Most goods were in new or used condition, but some were 
described as “rubbish” (laji 垃圾). The company behind the account also 
provided services to facilitate shipment to China. However, National Sword 
kicked in soon thereafter and may well have all but eradicated DEEE smuggling. 
Toward the end of my stay in China, the topic had become very sensitive and I 
had a hard time getting traders or recyclers to speak about it.
In line with crackdown operations, the official terminology on scrap 
imports changed dramatically. These types of objects became routinely 
referred to as “foreign rubbish” (yang laji  洋垃圾), decried as dirty and 
dangerous and depicted as a threat to the country. The authorities portrayed 
themselves as defenders acting to protect the Chinese people and their 
environment. This official stance, which marks the Chinese Party-state’s 
embrace of the environmental dumping narrative, is worlds away from 
that of the 2 0 0 0 s. In order to understand the shift from one to the other, 
one needs to keep in mind the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) broader 
adoption of the discourse of environmentalism in the 2 0 1 0 s. Faced with 
severe and ever-worsening environmental degradation, the CCP sought to 
not only attenuate it but also control the anxiety and discontent it caused 
among Chinese citizens, which represented a threat to political legitimacy. 
In order to depoliticise the issue, the powers that be came up with a form 
of environmentalism that had strong nationalist and techno-utopian 
dimensions. They encapsulated it in the watchword “ecological civilisation” 
(shengtai wenming 生態文明) and promoted it through a heavy use of 
green propaganda (Hubbert 2 0 1 5 ; Goron 2 0 1 8 ). The rhetoric of yang laji , 
which passes the buck for China’s environmental woes to foreign powers 
and creates the impression that Chinese leadership is part of the solution 
rather than the problem, illustrates this well: it is built around the arguments 
of self-defence, pollution prevention, and national pride (see Liebman 2 0 1 8 ).
Chinese national policy on imports became even more restrictive in July 
2 0 1 7  when the central government imposed a total ban on no less than 2 4  
categories of scrap, including unsorted waste paper, tires, textiles, glass, and 
the vast majority of postconsumer plastics.1 5  By prohibiting postconsumer 
plastics, the ban added a further restriction on imports of DEEE, because, at 
the time, plastics found in DEEE were still being collected abroad and sent to 
China in large quantities. This wide-ranging ban came as a shock and quickly 
made headlines worldwide.1 6  It signalled a drastic change: China would no 
longer serve as the world’s outlet for waste material – or the world’s “dump,” 
to use a term encountered more frequently in media reports. As a result, 
vast quantities of recyclable waste would be displaced to other countries 
– for plastic waste, one estimate puts the figure at 1 1 1  million metric tons 
by 2 0 3 0  (Brooks et al . 2 0 1 8 : 2 ). By the time the ban had come into effect 
in January 2 0 1 8 , even non-specialists were aware that the Chinese Party-
state had fundamentally transformed the global scrap trade. And Beijing did 
not stop there. As of mid-2 0 1 9 , another eight categories of scrap have been 
banned from import, including key industrial metals, and 1 6  other categories 
are awaiting the same fate.1 7  Based on these developments, observers predict 
that very little scrap or waste material will flow into China in the future.1 8
9 . Robin Ingenthron, “Why We Should Ship Our Electronic ‘Waste’ to China and Africa,” Motherboard, 
3 1  March 2 0 1 1 , https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/d7 7 w9 m/e-waste-recycling-exports-
are-good (accessed on 1 5  July 2 0 2 0 ). 
1 0 . See Jim Puckett et al ., “Exporting Harm: The High-Tech Trashing of Asia,” Basel Action 
Network and Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition, 2 5  February 2 0 0 2 , http://www.ban.org/E-waste/
technotrashfinalcomp.pdf (accessed on 1 5  July 2 0 2 0 ).
1 1 . Ministry of Environmental Protection et al ., “固體廢物進口管理辦法” (Guti feiwu jinkou guanli 
banfa, Administrative Measures for the Import of Solid Waste), 2 0 1 1 , http://www.lawinfochina.
com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=8 8 6 2 &CGid=#menu1  (accessed on 1 5  July 2 0 2 0 ). 
1 2 . See, e.g., Patty Moore and Sally Houghton, “An Inside Look at Operation Green Fence,” Resource 
Recycling, 1 8  October 2 0 1 3 , https://resource-recycling.com/recycling/2 0 1 3 /1 0 /1 8 /inside-look-
operation-green-fence/ (accessed on 1 5  July 2 0 2 0 ).
1 3 . See General Administration of Customs, “全國海關部署‘國門利劍2 0 1 6 ’打私行動” 
(Quanguo haiguan bushu “guomen lijian 2 0 1 6 ” dasi xingdong), [no date], http://www.gov.cn/
xinwen/2 0 1 6 -0 3 /1 1 /content_5 0 5 2 2 8 9 .htm (accessed on 1 5  July 2 0 2 0 ). 
1 4 . See, e.g., “Police Bust ‘E-trash’ Smugglers, Seize 7 2 ,0 0 0  Tons of Goods,” Global Times, 2 6  February 
2 0 1 4 , http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/8 4 4 7 8 8 .shtml (accessed on 1 5  July 2 0 2 0 ).
1 5 . State Council, “禁止洋垃圾入境推進固體廢物進口管理制度改革實施方案” (Jinzhi yang 
laji rujing tuijin guti feiwu jinkou guanli zhidu gaige shishi fang’an, Implementation Plan for 
Prohibiting the Entry of Foreign Garbage and Advancing the Reform of the Solid Waste Import 
Administration System), 1 8  July 2 0 1 7 , http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2 0 1 7 -0 7 /2 7 /
content_5 2 1 3 7 3 8 .htm (accessed on 1 5  July 2 0 2 0 ). 
1 6 . See, e.g., “A Chinese Ban on Rubbish Imports is Shaking up the Global Junk Trade,” The Economist, 
2 7  September 2 0 1 8 , https://www.economist.com/special-report/2 0 1 8 /0 9 /2 7 /a-chinese-ban-on-
rubbish-imports-is-shaking-up-the-global-junk-trade (accessed on 1 5  July 2 0 2 0 ).
1 7 . “Additional Scrap Grades Now on China’s Restricted List,” Recycling Today, 8  January 2 0 1 9 , 
https://www.recyclingtodayglobal.com/article/china-adds-scrap-metal-restricted-list-2 0 1 9 / 
(accessed on 1 5  July 2 0 2 0 ). 
1 8 . Colin Staub, “China Reiterates Total Ban and Tries to Define ‘Solid Waste’,” Resource Recycling, 
9  April 2 0 1 9 , https://resource-recycling.com/recycling/2 0 1 9 /0 4 /0 9 /china-reiterates-total-ban-
and-tries-to-define-solid-waste/ (accessed on 1 5  July 2 0 2 0 ).
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China’s rural recycling economy collapses
In parallel with the progressive tightening up of Chinese national policy on 
imports of recyclable waste from the early 2 0 1 0 s onwards, the official stance 
towards rural recycling hubs also changed dramatically. These towns and 
villages located in the countryside and specialised in the sorting, dismantling, 
and processing of various types of scrap had played a key role in reform-era 
industrial networks in China, yet they started to face growing pressure from 
state authorities at the district level and above.
Going back to the conversation I had with the Hu brothers in Qingyuan in 
2 0 1 5 , what struck me is how concerned they were about the image of them 
and their profession that I would convey in what they called my “report” 
(baodao 報道). Very quickly, they told me that they had agreed to share 
information about their business activities because they hoped that I would 
emphasise positive things, not negative ones – in particular not pollution. 
What mattered most, they argued, was that measures had already been taken 
to upgrade the recycling sector in Qingyuan and attenuate its environmental 
impact. Hu Ge and Hu Di sought to distinguish themselves from other 
recyclers based in the same region, who engaged in more or less the same 
activities, only on a smaller scale. They stressed that their scrapyard, where 
I had bumped into them, was located inside a well-established industrial 
park run by a state-owned company that reports directly to the central 
government and possesses all necessary authorisations. According to them, 
this made their operations fundamentally superior to those located outside 
the park, in the surrounding countryside. To buttress their claim, they stressed 
that the industrial park was equipped with a water treatment facility. 
In order to understand the brothers’ statements, we need to place them 
in the context of the far-reaching transformation of the Chinese recycling 
sector that took place in the mid-2 0 1 0 s (see Schulz 2 0 1 8 ). At the time, local 
governments in several rural recycling hubs throughout China conducted 
crackdowns with the aim of shutting down the vast majority of small 
recycling workshops (Goldstein 2 0 1 7 ; Lora-Wainwright 2 0 1 7 ; Schulz 2 0 1 9 ; 
Schulz and Lora-Wainwright 2 0 1 9 ). The enterprise run by the Hu brothers 
was well-positioned and relatively successful, but also middle-sized (they 
employed roughly 5 0  workers) and therefore potentially vulnerable to such 
drastic state measures. By describing their operations as “formal” (zhenggui 
正規), “legal” (hefa 合法), and “clean” (qingjie 清潔), Hu Ge and Hu Di 
sought to place themselves on the right side of history. They understood 
that, as private entrepreneurs involved in the scrap trade, they had to side 
with the authorities, or at least embrace official discourse, or else their days 
would be numbered.
And yet, the Hu brothers’ efforts may have been in vain. In January 2 0 1 7 , 
I realised by visiting Hu Ge’s social media account that he had started a new 
business and was selling decorative ceramic articles in large quantities. This 
suggests that he may have had to abandon the scrap trade, which is something 
many of his peers have done (see Schulz and Lora-Wainwright 2 0 1 9 ).
Scrap processing moves abroad
Together, the new Chinese national policy on imports of recyclable waste 
and the intense official pressure on workshops and small companies involved 
in recycling in the Chinese countryside triggered both a redirection of global 
flows1 9  (Brooks et al . 2 0 1 8 ) and a redistribution of global dismantling, 
sorting, and processing activities.
Scrap exporters based abroad who used to rely on shipments to China 
could not do so anymore, and many of them turned to other outlets. The 
high availability of scrap on the global market pushed certain countries to 
take on a more prominent role as importers. Imports of waste plastics to 
Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam, in particular, grew dramatically, thanks in 
large part to the fact that these countries had fewer import regulations and 
less stringent controls, or none at all. For a few years, at least, Southeast Asia 
absorbed a significant part of the volume of waste plastics that had once 
entered China.2 0  At the same time, sorting and processing capacity increased 
in this region. Places such as Minh Khai, a village in North Vietnam that 
specialises in waste plastics, experienced a recycling boom that generated 
not only more prosperity but also more pollution locally (Le Meur 2 0 1 9 : 
3 3 6 ).
Likewise, China-based scrap processors who used to rely on imports 
of foreign goods could not do so anymore, and some of them relocated 
their activities abroad. The trend may have started earlier among recyclers 
specialising in DEEE than among those specialising in plastics or other 
materials, since DEEE was banned from entering China comparatively early. 
While doing research in Guangdong Province, I heard many stories of local 
inhabitants who had moved abroad, especially to Southeast Asia, and set up 
recycling operations there. According to one media account of the situation 
in Thailand, “Chinese businessmen have set about attempting to open about 
1 0 0  plastic and e-waste recycling plants” since January 2 0 1 8 .2 1
This topic emerged repeatedly from interviews I conducted in Guiyu 
in April 2 0 1 8 . Everyone I spoke with in that town and neighbouring ones 
seemed to know personally someone who was now living in a Southeast 
Asian country and making a living from recycling. For instance, Yang Liu, a 
young trader of waste plastics living just outside Guiyu, told me that several 
of his plastic recycler friends had moved abroad, including one to Vietnam 
and one to Malaysia. The latter had tried to convince Liu to join his venture, 
but failed. The initial plan involved four partners who would each invest ten 
million renminbi. This high figure surprised me, so Liu explained: “Some five 
million have to be spent on equipment alone. Once this is done, there are 
still a lot of other costs to cover.” My reaction was to ask: “If it’s so costly, 
then what’s the point?”, to which Liu replied:
Plastics recycling is good business. You can earn good money. 
Regardless of how much you invest, you can be sure that you’ll start 
making profit after four or five months. That’s why a lot of people here 
[i.e. in Guiyu and neighbouring towns] got involved in plastics recycling 
in the first place.
Profits were potentially considerable, but a lot of people who used to 
be involved in the recycling business in and around Guiyu had been forced 
to give up this economic activity in recent years, due to the progressive 
tightening up of China’s scrap import policy and the crackdowns that 
affected recycling workshops and small plants (Schulz 2 0 1 9 ). According 
to Liu, some people had switched to other lines of business, including 
e-commerce (see also Schulz and Lora-Wainwright 2 0 1 9 ), while others had 
moved abroad.
Liu pointed out that even relative newcomers had invested in plastics 
recycling abroad. His younger sister and her husband, for instance, had 
recently set up a plastics processing plant in Thailand, even though they 
1 9 . Leslie Hook and John Reed, “Why the World’s Recycling System Stopped Working,” Financial 
Times , 2 5  October 2 0 1 8 , https://www.ft.com/content/3 6 0 e2 5 2 4 -d7 1 a-1 1 e8 -a8 5 4 -
3 3 d6 f8 2 e6 2 f8  (accessed on 1 5  July 2 0 2 0 ).
2 0 . Ibid. 
2 1 . Hannah Ellis-Petersen, “Deluge of Electronic Waste Turning Thailand into ‘World’s Rubbish 
Dump’,” The Guardian, 2 8  June 2 0 1 8 , https://www.theguardian.com/world/2 0 1 8 /jun/2 8 /deluge-
of-electronic-waste-turning-thailand-into-worlds-rubbish-dump (accessed on 1 5  July 2 0 2 0 ).
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possessed few skills and little expertise in that field. Like Liu’s friend, the 
brother-in-law in question had also tried to convince him to join their 
venture, but to no avail. One of the reasons why Liu did not want to team 
up with the couple is that he thought ventures in countries such as Thailand, 
Vietnam, and Malaysia had poor prospects:
This type of investment is too risky. These countries are tourism 
hotspots, so you can be sure that the governments there will also 
launch environmental inspections soon. 
Liu knew first-hand about the environmental impact of plastics recycling. 
In the past, he and his family had done some “processing” (jiagong 加工) 
using a “shredder” (fensuiji  粉碎機), a very noisy machine that consumes 
large amounts of electricity, and an “extruding pelletizer” (jiya zaoli ji  擠壓
造粒機), which produces toxic fumes. When this type of activity became too 
risky due to the heightened frequency of “environmental inspections” (cha 
huanbao 查環保) in and around Guiyu, they gave up and focused exclusively 
on “commerce” (maimai 買賣).
Another one of my interviewees, who traded waste plastics like Liu, also 
thought that Chinese recyclers would soon become unwelcome in Southeast 
Asian countries due to their negative environmental impact:
Too many of our people have moved there and opened [recycling] 
plants. If that continues, the governments of these countries will 
realise that these plants cause pollution and they will start to control 
them more strictly.
As it happens, the official stance toward Chinese recyclers and the 
recycling boom more generally in Southeast Asia had already changed by 
the time I last visited Guiyu (in April 2 0 1 8 ). In one emblematic case, which 
received media attention worldwide,2 2  the Thai customs and police forces 
raided a large dismantling and processing facility located just outside 
Bangkok, which belonged to a Chinese national and specialised in DEEE 
(including plastics contained in DEEE). Photographs of the plant and its 
outside storage area show thousands of bulk bags filled to the brim and 
piled on top of each other, which suggests that the plant operated on a large 
scale, even though it did not qualify as “formal.” Soon thereafter, the Thai 
government announced that it would stem the tide of recyclables flowing 
into Thailand by imposing an import ban, thereby following in the footsteps 
of the Chinese government. More or less at the same time, the governments 
of several other Southeast Asian countries, including Malaysia, Vietnam, and 
Indonesia, joined the movement by announcing import bans of their own.2 3  
India has taken the same path,2 4  possibly setting an example for other South 
Asian countries to follow.
As a result, investing in Asia is not a really an option anymore for Chinese 
recycling companies seeking to relocate outside of China. The larger and 
more established companies, which can invest in infrastructure but will only 
do so in a predictable business environment, are considering other regions, 
e.g. Latin America and the Caribbean.2 5  For them, a key factor is proximity 
to the abundant source of recyclables that North America represents. Some 
companies are also assessing the feasibility of setting up recycling plants 
in the United States themselves.2 6  As for the smaller business entities, they 
seem to attach more importance to proximity with the destination market – 
which China remains to a large extent – since most of them have chosen to 
settle in Southeast Asia.
Part of China’s waste plastics processing capacity may have moved to 
Southeast Asia, but the main market for recycled plastics from that region 
remains China itself. Wang Lei and his wife, who buy and sell “low grade” 
(diduan 低端) waste plastics and sort them manually close to Guiyu, 
explained to me in April 2 0 1 8  that pellets produced through recycling could 
still be imported into China, because they did not count as waste, unlike 
unsorted and unprocessed plastic scrap. They stressed that when processing 
is done abroad, it causes no pollution within China. Therefore, according to 
them, it is unlikely that the Chinese government would ban imports of this 
type of material.
It is important to note that the relocation of some of China’s processing 
capacity to developing countries did not start with the ban announced in 
July 2 0 1 7 , although it certainly gained speed from that moment on. To some 
extent, the phenomenon can be traced back further. In Africa, in particular, 
the presence of a significant number of Chinese processors specialising in 
waste plastics is attested in several countries since the late 2 0 0 0 s and early 
2 0 1 0 s (see Furniss 2 0 1 5  on Egypt; Xia 2 0 1 9  on Tanzania; and Bräutigam et 
al . 2 0 1 8  on Tanzania, Ghana, Ethiopia and Nigeria). Key factors that pushed 
these Chinese processors to move away from home at the time include high 
competition among recycling enterprises and rising labour costs. Key factors 
that attracted them to Africa include a growing availability of recyclable 
waste and cheap labour costs.
Offering scrap solutions abroad
As we have seen above, in the span of only a few years, China has gone 
from being the world’s main importer of recyclables to being a country 
whose borders are virtually impermeable to these types of goods. All the 
same, the country continues to be faced with massive quantities of waste. In 
2 0 1 7 , the Chinese economy ranked second in the world in terms of nominal 
GDP and was growing much faster than that of all the economies in the top 
ten, with the exception of India’s. Fast-paced industrialisation, widespread 
urbanisation, and the advent of consumerism, which have been going on 
in China for decades, have led to the generation of huge amounts of waste 
within the country (Goldstein 2 0 1 2 : 3 4 2 )2 7  – and there promises to be even 
more in coming years, given the prospect of sustained economic growth.
This profusion of waste must be dealt with, in one way or another. The 
current leadership acknowledges the problem and has started to tackle it 
head-on. Over the past few years, one of its main ambitions has consisted 
in upgrading domestic waste management. This is particularly evident in 
MSW collection in urban areas, which has become a nationwide priority – 
significantly, Chinese President Xi Jinping himself champions the cause.2 8  
From 2 0 1 7  to 2 0 1 9 , the State Council and national-level agencies adopted 
6 5 % 
1 % 
2 2 . E.g. ibid. 
2 3 . Colin Staub, “Import Restrictions Ripple Across Southeast Asia,” Resource Recycling, 5  June 
2 0 1 8 , https://resource-recycling.com/recycling/2 0 1 8 /0 6 /0 5 /import-restrictions-ripple-across-
southeast-asia/ (accessed on 1 5  July 2 0 2 0 ). 
2 4 . Harry Cockburn, “India Bans Imports of Waste Plastic to Tackle Environmental Crisis,” The 
Independent, 7  March 2 0 1 9 , https://www.independent.co.uk/environment/india-plastic-waste-
ban-recycling-uk-china-a8 8 1 1 6 9 6 .html (accessed on 1 5  July 2 0 2 0 ). 
2 5 . Steve Toloken, “China’s Recyclers Look at Latin America, Caribbean,” Plastic News, 3  April 2 0 1 9 , 
https://www.plasticsnews.com/article/2 0 1 9 0 4 0 3 /NEWS/1 9 0 4 0 9 9 6 7 /china-s-recyclers-look-at-
latin-america-caribbean (accessed on 1 5  July 2 0 2 0 ). 
2 6 . Lindsey Jacobson, “Why Chinese Companies are Investing in American Recycling,” CNBC, 
1 st March 2 0 2 0 , https://www.cnbc.com/2 0 2 0 /0 2 /2 8 /why-chinese-companies-are-investing-in-
american-recycling.html (accessed on 1 5  July 2 0 2 0 ).
2 7 . World Bank, “Waste Management in China: Issues and Recommendations,” Urban Deveopment 
Working Papers, nr. 9 , May 2 0 0 5 , https://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPREGTOPURBDEV/
Resources/China-Waste-Management1 .pdf (accessed on 1 5  July 2 0 2 0 ).
2 8 . “Xi Jinping Stresses Habit of Garbage Sorting,” CGTN, 3  June 2 0 1 9 , https://news.cgtn.com/news/
3 d3 d7 7 4 d3 4 5 9 4 4 4 d3 5 4 5 7 a6 3 3 3 5 6 6 d5 4 /index.html (accessed on 1 5  July 2 0 2 0 ). 
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a series of measures2 9  aimed at bringing into being state-controlled systems 
for MSW sorting in all large Chinese cities, once and for all. On paper at 
least, such systems had been in place since the 2 0 0 0 s, but they remained 
all but ineffective (see, e.g., Zhang 2 0 1 5  on Guangzhou and Tong and Tao 
2 0 1 6  on Beijing). Scrap-related activities in large cities were dominated 
by market mechanisms and internal migrants belonging to the so-called 
“informal sector” (fei zhenggui jun 非正規軍, i.e., self-employed workers, 
family businesses, and MSMEs; see Zhang 2 0 1 9 ), which stood in the way of 
government plans to “formalise” (zhengguihua 正規化). City governments 
throughout China had been grappling with the issue for more than a decade 
when the central government stepped in, imposing a target recycling rate 
of 3 5 % by 2 0 2 0 , among other things. Suddenly, they needed to seriously 
ramp up their efforts. The municipality of Shanghai, for instance, made MSW 
sorting compulsory, first for sanitation workers3 0  and later for city residents.3 1
The central government’s restrictive stance on scrap imports needs to 
be interpreted in light of the above. There is good reason to believe that 
the goals of strengthening China’s domestic waste collection and recycling 
industry and increasing its resource autonomy weighed more heavily in 
official considerations than that of preventing environmental dumping, be it 
only because, by the time the 2 0 1 7  import ban was announced, foreign scrap 
was actually “immaculate,” according to Minter.3 2  The rationale behind the 
banning of imports may have been to create scarcity, push domestic prices 
upwards, and make it easier (because more profitable) to capture recyclables. 
It was definitely part of a larger plan to move the Chinese recycling industry 
from artisanal to industrial and prop up state-run systems.
The central government’s ambition to radically transform China’s 
domestic waste industry can be seen not only in its efforts to increase 
collection rates, but also in its programme to upgrade the management and 
treatment of various types of recyclable wastes, in particular DEEE. In the 
early 2 0 1 0 s the powers that be entrusted DEEE dismantling and shredding 
to companies that own vast facilities, use state-of-the-art technology, and 
are able to handle complex bureaucratic procedures. By favouring large 
socioeconomic entities, including through subsidies, they aimed to squeeze 
out small ones, in particular “informal” recyclers, deemed problematic 
on account of their size (too “small,” xiao 小), spatial distribution (too 
“scattered,” san 散), operational mode (too “disorderly,” luan 亂), and 
environmental impact (too polluting or “dirty,” zang 髒) (Schulz 2 0 1 5 ). 
Success on this front took time – indeed, it has not yet been fully reached 
ten years down the line – but what officials in Beijing managed to achieve 
quickly was to bring into being a new subsector composed of more than a 
hundred large companies specialized in DEEE recycling (Schulz 2 0 1 8 ). Many 
of these companies belong to large Chinese groups specialising in electronics, 
e.g., TCL Technology, one of the world’s largest manufacturer of television 
sets. And only a handful are attached to foreign groups.
Large companies specialising in scrap recycling are currently growing rapidly 
in China thanks to the unique opportunity created by official policy, state 
support, and widely available public money. As a result, some have decided 
to branch out overseas. Shenzhen-listed GEM Co. Ltd. is a good example. The 
company, which specialises in DEEE recycling and develops related technology 
and equipment, recently invested in the construction of industrial parks in 
South Africa, Indonesia, and South Korea. According to its website,3 3  GEM strives 
to “become a world-leading green enterprise” by “actively participat[ing] in 
global waste recycling industry cooperation.” Explicit reference is made to 
the central government’s global development strategy: “GEM will (…) build 
the green industry to connect with the ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative.” And GEM 
sees as its mission to implement the “green development concept of the 
Chinese government” and “show the world [the] responsibility of Chinese 
environmental protection companies.” In other words, the company portrays 
itself as an ambassador for official plans to promote China as an upcoming 
leader in sustainable solutions to the global environmental predicament.
Many of the large waste management companies that are expanding 
abroad are state-owned. These companies’ core business is waste treatment 
and disposal – Capital Environment Holdings Limited (CEHL) and Everbright 
International, for instance, are both known as major players in China’s 
incineration (“waste-to-energy”) business – but they generally also have 
departments or subsidiaries specialising in scrap collection, sorting, and 
processing. They invest, provide a wide range of waste-related solutions and 
services, and build facilities abroad, including in Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 
member countries. By doing so, they are emerging as international players and 
starting to compete in the global arena with more established, non-Chinese 
companies, e.g., Waste Management Inc. and Veolia Environmental Services.
In sum, we are now witnessing a third wave of Chinese engagement 
abroad in the scrap business. Unlike the previous two, this one features large 
corporations, most of which have strong links with Chinese state authorities. 
It results chiefly from the growth and modernisation of China’s domestic 
waste management industry in recent years and the official strategy to push 
Chinese corporations to invest and develop activities in foreign countries, be 
it in the name of the BRI or the older “going-out” (zouchuqu 走出去) policy.
Conclusion
This paper provided an historical account of Chinese engagement in the 
trade and transformation of recyclable waste abroad as well as a description 
of current trends. Focusing on discarded plastics and discarded electrical 
and electronic equipment (DEEE), it identified three waves (or phases) and 
described their respective characteristics. As we have seen, the scope, forms, 
and modalities of Chinese engagement abroad in the scrap business have 
varied according to the area and era under consideration.
For many years, Chinese socioeconomic entities operating abroad engaged 
exclusively in trade. It is only after 2 0 1 0  that some of them also began to 
sort, dismantle, and process waste in foreign countries. Likewise, the story 
about this form of Chinese engagement abroad has long been mainly about 
self-employed workers, family businesses, and MSMEs, as those were the 
actors that derived their livelihood or profit from the trade, transportation, 
and transformation of scrap, especially with regard to discarded plastics 
and DEEE. My account of these two first waves highlighted the calculations 
made, the risks taken and the obstacles faced by the actors involved in 
connection with their presence overseas, thereby drawing a (partial) portrait 
of the Chinese petty capitalist economy as it engaged abroad in the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first century.
2 9 . For a list, see Chang Jiwen, “推進垃圾分類要保持歷史耐心” (Tuijin laji fenlei yao baochi lishi 
naixin, The push for garbage sorting requires historical patience), Kexue wang, 1 8  June 2 0 1 9 , 
http://news.sciencenet.cn/htmlnews/2 0 1 9 /6 /4 2 7 5 1 2 .shtm (accessed on 1 5  July 2 0 2 0 ). 
3 0 . Teng Jingxuan and Ge Mingning, “Shanghai Talks Trash,” Caixin Global, 1 8  May 2 0 1 8 , https://www.
caixinglobal.com/2 0 1 8 -0 5 -1 8 /shanghai-talks-trash-1 0 1 2 5 2 4 2 3 .html (accessed on 1 5  July 2 0 2 0 ). 
3 1 . Wu Yixiu, “Shanghai’s Compulsory Waste Sorting Begins,” China Dialogue, 2  July 2 0 1 9 , https://
chinadialogue.net/en/cities/1 1 3 4 9 -shanghai-s-compulsory-waste-sorting-begins/ (accessed on 
1 5  July 2 0 2 0 ).
3 2 . Charlotte Middlehurst, “Q&A [with Adam Minter]: China’s waste ban debate is ‘misinformed’ 
and ‘one-dimensional’,” China Dialogue, August 2 4 , 2 0 1 8 , https://chinadialogue.net/en/
pollution/1 0 7 8 9 -q-a-china-s-waste-ban-debate-is-misinformed-and-one-dimensional/ 
(accessed on 1 5  July 2 0 2 0 ).
3 3 . GEM, “Company Profile,” [no date], http://en.gem.com.cn/index.php/gongsijianjie/ (accessed on 
1 5  July 2 0 2 0 ).
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Today, a new form of Chinese engagement abroad is in the making. As 
far as one can judge from developments that date back only a few years, 
it features large corporations rather than grassroots entrepreneurs. All of 
these corporations benefit considerably from their direct collaboration 
with national, provincial, and municipal governments in China, which 
provide support, investment, and subsidies – not to speak of the occasional 
preferential treatment obtained through corruption. Many of these 
corporations are even owned by the Chinese state – which, in a way, is 
reminiscent of the waste management system set up by the Party-state 
in China in Maoist times (see Goldstein 2 0 0 5 ). Without state backing, it is 
unlikely that these corporations would have been able to venture abroad. 
In sum, whereas the two first waves of Chinese engagement abroad in 
the scrap business qualify as “globalisation from below,” the third one fits 
with classic understanding of globalisation as a phenomenon driven mainly 
by the world’s governments, corporations, and major financial institutions, 
in other words as something “from above.” The third wave also marks a 
transition away from a scrap collection and recycling sector populated 
chiefly by private, independent actors towards one where public actors play 
a predominant role. This evolution reflects the firm grip that China’s current 
leadership has taken on the economy.
By moving the cursor back and forth between scales, this paper has 
revealed the links that exist between China’s national and international 
policies. It has shown, in particular, that the yang laji  rhetoric should not 
be taken at face value, but rather understood as part of a wider effort by 
the central government to upgrade domestic recycling and place it back 
within the purview of the state. Establishing formal recycling systems is a 
big challenge, not only for China, but for all “emerging” economies, and even 
more so for developing countries, which have the world’s fastest-growing 
waste generation rates. And behind every challenge lies an opportunity. 
For the Chinese authorities and the corporations they collaborate with, the 
opportunity consists of taking full advantage of the experience they have 
gained and are still gaining at home to export their expertise and solutions 
abroad. That they have identified and are seizing this opportunity is evident 
in the discourse on sustainability that accompanies the promotion of the 
BRI as well as in the emergence of quite a few Chinese corporations as major 
international players, despite fierce competition.
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